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Abstract:  
Electricity markets rely on other upstream energy markets like oil, gas, and coal to provide the 
necessary fuel for generation. As both the electricity market and those upstream markets rely on 
networks, congestion on one market may lead to changes on another. In this paper we analyze the 
interaction of the natural gas network with the electricity network applying a partial equilibrium 
approach. The model is applied to a stylized representation of the European energy markets. We apply 
the model to two cases: first the impact of a supply reduction of natural gas on both markets by cutting 
imports from Russia, and second, the impact of the introduction of an emission restriction on 
electricity generation. Since natural gas can be an input for electricity generation, gas price level 
changes alter the generation dispatch. However, the network character of both markets leads to further 
effects that are not obvious on first sight. Congestion between markets and particular effects due to 
loop flows in electricity markets can lead to price and quantity effects in markets far away from the 
initial cause of market changes.  
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1 Introduction 
Within the next decades, energy markets around the world face a multitude of challenges. Markets 
formerly characterized by imperfect competition are in the process of being restructured to 
competitive industries. Carbon emissions need to be reduced for a sustainable future. Long term 
investments need to be stimulated in order to guarantee security of supply of energy commodities. 
Already challenging tasks in isolated markets, the interaction of energy markets further complicates 
these processes. Electricity markets serve as a linkage between different fuel markets as in the long 
run fuels can substitute one another. Consequently, decisions regarding the future development on 
electricity markets such as the projected ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development Plan will have a 
direct impact on the upstream fuel markets. Likewise, the imposition of carbon regulation favors the 
use of less carbon intensive fuels and, in turn, stipulates demand for these fuels. On the other hand, 
market or investment decisions on fuel markets – such as the projected increase in LNG import 
capacities in Europe – have a direct impact on the downstream electricity market as they influence the 
availability of fuels and change the price levels. This interaction is further complicated by the fact that 
most fuel markets rely on some kind of network infrastructure (pipeline, sea routes, and railways) to 
distribute their commodity. Similarly, electricity markets are grid-bounded and have to take account of 
physical power flow laws. The different networks are characterized by a substitution relationship. For 
example, electricity can be produced and sold in Germany using a gas-fired power plant requiring 
pipeline transport of the natural gas to Germany. Likewise, electricity can be produced in the 
Netherlands and sold in Germany using the electricity grid. However, this substitution is bounded by 
the capacity of the transmission grid. Therefore, congestion effects typical for grid-bounded 
transportation need to be taken into account when analyzing the interaction of energy markets and the 
energy system as a whole.  
The objective of this paper is to provide a modeling framework that accounts for the interaction of fuel 
and electricity markets while simultaneously respecting the network character of those markets. We 
apply the framework to a stylized representation of the European market. Simulating a short-fall of 
Russian natural gas exports and an emission reduction requirement, the results illustrate the 
importance of network representations analyzing energy markets. The interaction highlights the 
importance of a combined market assessment. Particularly, with respect to the aim of an internal fully 
liberalized European energy market impacts along the market chain need to be taken into account 
when deciding about future regulation, investment or market design plans. 
Concerning energy markets, two facts are important to recognize: First, energy markets are highly 
connected by electricity generation which relies on coal, natural gas, and oil as production input. 
Second, energy commodities such as electricity and natural gas are characterized by grid-bounded 
transportation. In turn, this has led to two different streams of numerical modeling approaches.  
On the one hand, energy system models tend to highlight the price interaction between single energy 
markets including a detailed description of the value chains such as extraction, transmission, and final 
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demands. However, these models tend to simplify transmission modeling by abstracting from 
networks such as natural gas pipelines or electricity grids. In a partial equilibrium setting, such models 
are formulated in an optimization framework such as e.g. MARKAL (Loulou et al., 2004 ), POLES 
(Kouvaritakis et al., 2000), MESSAGE (Grübler and Messner, 1998), or in an equilibrium format such 
as LIBEMOD (Aune et al. 2001). More macroeconomic oriented models with a focus on the 
representation of the energy system are represented either in a computable general equilibrium format 
such as e.g. the MIT-EPPA (Paltsev et al., 2005) and GEM-E3 (Capros et al., 1997) model or as  
intertemporal welfare maximizing Ramsey-type models e.g. REMIND (Bauer et al., 2008) On a more 
technical oriented level simulation and optimization approaches are used. These models are often 
focused on material flows, the optimal fuel usage, or power plant mix. In this class, the PERSEUS-
EEM model is close to our work (Möst and Perlwitz, 2009). They include a natural gas pipeline into a 
cost minimizing inter-regional long-term model. In contrast to our work, the approximate electricity 
transport by net-transfer capacities, i.e. do not explicitly model loop-flows typical for electricity grids. 
On the other hand, a broad stream of literature analyzes single energy industries with a detailed 
representation of the technological details of grid-bounded transmission. As grid-bounded 
transmission leads to natural monopolies such model particularly emphasize the role of imperfect 
competition. Mathiessen et al. (1987) show that the European natural gas market is best described by a 
Cournot duopoly. Gabriel et al. (2005) and Egging et al. (2009) presented a Nash-Cournot framework 
of the US and European natural gas market including pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
transportation. EWI Cologne has produced a series of linear optimization models of which the TIGER 
model provides the most detailed dispatch model for Europe and is suited for identifying congestion 
(Perner and Seeliger, 2004; Lochner and Bothe, 2007). Holz (2009) discusses these different model 
families in more detail.  
Network oriented electricity market models include the power flow along different lines. In contrast to 
natural gas pipelines, in an electricity network the power flow is physically determined by the 
injections and withdrawals at nodes, i.e. loop-flows need to be modeled. Smeers (1997) and Ventosa et 
al. (2005) provide an overview over numerical modeling approaches. As natural gas models, network 
oriented electricity models examine the effect of imperfect competition (e.g. Hobbs, 2001; Neuhoff et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, network models applying the DC load flow approach are commonly used for 
economic market analyses (e.g. Stigler and Todem, 2005; Green, 2007; Leuthold et al. 2008). 
To our knowledge, the interconnection of energy transmission networks has not received attention in 
the energy-economic related literature. However, the challenge of combining grid-bounded electricity 
and natural gas transportation is discussed in the engineering literature. An et al. (2003) note the 
importance of considering the combined natural gas and electric optimal power flow problem 
(GEOPF) and present a simplified model combining networks at a single node. The GEOPF problem 
considers natural gas transportation at a disaggregated distribution stage, i.e. the natural gas flows in 
the network are controlled involving compressors. Depending on the use of compressors, the direction 
of flow on a pipeline is determined. Thus, the GEOPF results in an integer problem regarding the 
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natural gas flows.1 The approach has been extended by e.g. Unisihuay et al. (2007) for multiple 
interconnection points. Arnold et al. (2008) present a decomposition approach for the GEOPF in order 
to allow larger dimension applications. While the GEOPF approach represents technological details in 
great detail, it is limited from an economic point of view as the usage of integer variables leads to 
problems representing price variables (O’Neil et al., 2005).  
In this paper, we present a general framework to combine energy markets including detailed network 
characteristics using the mixed complementarity problem format. Concentrating on the natural gas 
transmission stage, i.e. assuming directed pipeline flows but avoiding integer modeling problems, our 
approach allows for a more detailed analysis of energy systems on a large regional scale. Similar, 
focusing on electricity transmission, we derive a power flow based market representation applying the 
DC load flow approach. In a stylized model of the European energy market, we present two scenarios 
– the reduction of natural gas imports from Russia and the imposition of a carbon emission constraint 
on the European electricity sectors – which highlight the importance of recognizing the economic 
interaction of grid-bounded energy commodity transport. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the modeling framework. 
First, the single market models are presented. Afterwards, the combination of the single market model 
is described. In Section 3, we parameterize the modeling framework to the European Union, describe 
the scenarios and present their results. Finally, we summarize our work, draw conclusions, and 
identify fields for future research. 
 
2 Model Description 
Following we will formulate the market representations for the electricity, the natural gas and the 
combined setting. The models will be defined as Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) (e.g. 
Rutherford, 1995);  
  (1) 
   
n n
n
T
given f :
find r    
s.t.    r 0    f r 0  r f r 0
 

  
                                                     
Following Mathiesen (1985) two types of equilibrium conditions can be distinguished in an MCP: 
zero-profit and market clearing conditions. In general, zero-profit conditions are complementary to 
activity variables, while market clearing conditions are associated with prices.  
The considered markets differ in their network representation but have similarities in the definition of 
producers and consumers. Producers are assumed to maximize their profit given technical constraints 
whereas consumer behavior is defined via a demand function. Each producer is endowed with 
production capacity with specific unit cost. Network operation is assumed to be managed by a single 
network operator also acting as the market operator clearing production and demand. 
1 Put differently, at the distribution stage pipeline flow are undirected. Thus, the decision using compressors results in a 
integer decision over the direction of natural gas flow along a pipeline.  
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2.1 The natural gas market 
Natural gas is either transported via pipelines or using liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. In both 
alternatives, the operator has full control of the amount injected into the network and the routes chosen 
to transport the gas. However, while in pipeline networks the capacity of a pipeline is restricted, LNG 
flows are restricted by the liquefaction and regasification at the origin and destination nodes. 
We denote nodes in the natural gas network by g and h Є G. A node is characterized by the supplier at 
these node, natural gas demand, and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) technologies, i.e. the liquefaction 
regasification potential. Nodes are connected via pipelines of a given capacity capg,hpipe. LNG 
connections between nodes are unrestricted in capacity but restricted by the available liquefaction 
(capgliq) and regasification (capgreg) capacities.  
Five market participants interact in the model: Natural gas producers, traders, the pipeline operator, 
LNG operators, and final consumers. Final consumers are served by traders only. Producers extract the 
natural gas and sell it either to the trader or to the LNG operator. The LNG operator buys the natural 
gas from producers at some node (with liquefaction capacity), transports it to another node (with 
regasification capacity), and sells it to the trader. Traders buy natural gas from producers or LNG 
operators, buy the transport service to transport the gas from the pipeline operator, and sell it to the 
final consumers. The pipeline owner operates the pipeline network and rents out capacity to the trader 
in order to transport natural gas.    
Final consumers are represented by a linear demand curve:  
  (2)                     0 gas gas gas gas gasg g g g gDEM a b PD DEM   
Where DEMggas and PDggas are natural gas demand and price at node g. aggas (bggas) are strictly 
positive (non-positive) constants.  
Constant extraction costs cggas and the extraction capacity capggas characterize the natural gas producer 
at node g. Assuming perfect competition, each producer maximizes his profit under the extraction 
capacity restriction choosing the extraction quantity Xggas given the natural gas supply price PSggas: 
  
0
max
gas
g
gas gas gas
g g g
X
PS c X

  
                       (3) . .  s t cap                          0gas gas gasg g gX  PC 
PCggas is the scarcity price of the extraction capacity at node g. Accordingly, the zero-profit condition 
for each producer becomes: 
  (4)                      0gas gas gas gasg g g gc PC PS X   
The LNG trader buys natural gas at node g from the producers at the supply price and sells it at node h 
also at the supply price to traders. LNG transport on a specific route from g to h incurs constant units 
cost cg,hLNG. Furthermore, the liquefaction and regasification process require energy in form of natural 
gas. Therefore, after the liquefaction process only the faction α of the natural gas bought remains. 
After the liquefaction process, the transported amount is further reduced by the fraction β of the 
transport volume. The LNG trader maximizes his profit under the regasification and liquefaction 
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constraint choosing the transported volume Tg,hLNG (i.e. the volume net of liquefaction losses but gross 
of regasification losses) given prices: 
 
,
, ,
,
max
LNG
g h
gas
ggas LNG LNG
h g h
T g h
PS
PS c T 
      g h

 
                                  s.t.     ,                       0
reg LNG reg
g h g g
h
cap T PC   (5) 
  (6) ,                            0
liq LNG liq
g g h g
h
cap T PC  
PCgliq and PCgreg are the scarcity prices of liquefaction and regasification capacity, respectively. The 
corresponding zero profit condition for the transported LNG volume becomes: 
 , ,               0
gas
gLNG liq reg gas LNG
g h g h h g h
PS
c PC PC PS T        (7) 
The trader buys natural gas at node  ( ) and sells this gas at node h (g buygT ,gasg hT ).2 In order to transport 
the gas from node  along the pipeline from g to h (g , ,gasg g hF ) he has to buy transport service from the 
pipeline operator at price PTg,hpipe. Therefore, the trader maximizes his profit by choosing the 
purchased and sold amount of natural gas and the flow along the pipelines under the flow conservation 
constraint for each node: 
 
, , ,
, ,
, , 0 , ,
max
buy gas gas
g g h g g h
, ,
gas gas gas buy pipe gas
h g h g g g h g g h
T T F g h g g h
PD T PS T PT F

              
 s.t.                  (8)  , , , , , ,                    freegas buy gas gas gasg g h g g h g g h g hif g h
g g
F T F T PN        
,
gas
g hPN   is the nodal price of the gas bought at node g at node h. The corresponding zero-profit 
conditions for the purchased and sold amount and the pipeline flow are given as: 
  (9) ,                        0
gas gas gas
g h h g hPN PD T  , 


  (10) ,                      0
gas gas buy
g g g gPS PN T    
  (11) , , , , ,                      0
pipe gas gas gas
g h g g g h g g hPT PN PN F    
The pipeline operator maximizes his revenues under the pipeline capacity constraints choosing the 
total flow of natural gas along the pipeline connecting g and h (Fg,hpipe ): 
  
,
, , ,
0 ,
max
gas
g h
pipe pipe pipe
g h g h g h
F g h
PT c F

  
                                s.t.           (12) , , ,                 0
pipe pipe pipe
g h g h g hcap F PC  
                                                     
PCg,hpipe is the scarcity price of pipeline capacity. The zero-profit condition for the optimal flow along 
the pipelines results as: 
g2 Throughout the text,  denotes the origin of the natural gas.  
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  (13) , , , ,                      0
pipe pipe pipe pipe
g h g h g h g hc PC PT F   
Prices are determined by market clearing conditions. At the supply market, the total available quantity 
is determined by production and the amount shipped to that node. Demand consists of purchases by 
the trader and LNG shipped away from this node (including liquefaction losses): 
 ,,                         0
LNG
g hgas LNG buy gas
g h g g g
h h
T
X T T PS      


                                                     
 (14) 
At the demand market the trader offers natural gas to final consumers: 
  (15) ,                      0
gas gas gas
h g g g
h
T DEM PD 
The market clearing condition for pipeline flows determine the transport price along a given pipeline: 
  (16) , , , ,                        0
pipe gas pipe
g h g g h g h
g
F F PT  

The full natural gas model consists of equation (2) to (16).  
We note that we have stated the model without defining a set of pipelines, possible natural gas origin 
or destination nodes, or LNG trading routes. Numerically implementing the model, we construct these 
sets out of the capacity parameters and fix variables for which no capacity exists to zero in order to 
reduce the size of the model.  
The model is static. Therefore, we decided not to include natural gas storage facilities. However, 
extending the model to include storage can be done by adding the zero-profit condition of the storage 
operator and the respective demand and supply to the market clearing equation (14) and (15). 
Assuming constant unit costs for all market participants and linear demand, we developed the model 
as a linear complementarity model. The restriction of linearity can be relaxed by putting other demand 
function into equation (2) and replacing the constant unit costs by some marginal cost function. The 
presented pipeline network consists of arcs with exogenously given direction using the pipeline 
capacities. Finally, we assumed perfect competition at all markets and, accordingly, representative 
agents. While relaxing this assumption for one group of market participants under simultaneous model 
timing is possible, introducing sequential timing is difficult resulting in mathematical or equilibrium 
problems with equilibrium constraints (M/EPEC).   
2.2 The electricity market 
Contrary to flows in the natural gas network, which are under the control of the network operator, 
system power flows in an electricity network are determined by Kirchhoff’s laws. Thus, injections and 
withdrawals at nodes impact the whole power flow pattern in the system leading to the problem of 
loop flows.3 Consequently, the choice variables of the grid operator are the amount of power injected 
or withdrawn at different nodes while the flows are solely determined by physical laws.  
3 For example, transporting electricity from the North of Germany to the South of Germany also leads to cross border flows 
through the Benelux and France. 
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We denote nodes in the electricity network by e Є E. A node is characterized by the generators at these 
node and electricity demand. Nodes are connected via lines l of a given capacity caplline. Three market 
participants interact in the model: generators, the network operator, and final consumers. Final 
consumers are served by the network operator, only, and generators sell to the network operator.  
The electricity network system operator does not trade on specific node pair combinations like in the 
natural gas setting or even specific lines. The whole power flow pattern is determined once the 
injections/withdrawals are set. In order to derive a mathematical formulation of this problem we 
include a hub node which roots all transactions taking place within the network. The system operator 
transfers all generated energy from the nodes e to the hub node and in turn provides all demanded 
energy at the nodes e via deliveries from the hub node. Thus, the choice variable for the system 
operator is the amount of energy transported to or from the hub to a node (Ye) which can be positive or 
negative depending of the definition of the energy balance (equation 23). The price of transmitting 
power is denoted as PTe and the system operator is maximizing its profits from transaction to and 
from the hub.  
Those transactions are mere financial constructs capturing the resulting price divergences due to 
physical constraints. The system operator has to ensure that the chosen injections and withdrawals at 
each node do not violate the existing line capacities caplline. In order to derive the power flow pattern 
one can use power transmission distribution factors (PTDFle) which state the share of a flow on a 
specific line resulting from specific injections/withdrawals. The whole system operator’s problem 
becomes: 
 max
e
el
e eY e
PT Y  
                                s.t.           linele e l l
e
PTDF Y cap PC   (17) 
 linele e l l
e
PTDF Y cap PC     (18) 
Equation (17) and (18) secure that the power flow on a line l does not exceed the capacity boundaries 
of the line caplline. As electricity flows can be positive or negative depending on the flow direction the 
capacity restriction has to hold in both directions. PCl+ and PCl- are the corresponding scarcity prices 
of line capacity. The zero-profit condition of the system operator is given as: 
  ele le l l e
l
PT PTDF PC PC Y free     (19) 
The relevant nodal electricity price Peel therefore is divided into two components: first a marginal 
energy price defined via the market clearing of the whole system (PHUB) and the transmission fee due 
to network congestion (PTe). The price at a node can be derived by summing those two components. 
Since PTe can be positive or negative the locational price can diverge in both directions from the Hub 
price.  
Final consumers are represented by a linear demand curve: 
  el el el el ele e e eDEM a b PT PHUB DEM    e  (20) 
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Where DEMeel is the electricity demand, PHUB and PTe yield the price at e. aeel (beel) are strictly 
positive (non-positive) constants.  
Generators at node e are defined by the available generation capacities of plant type i Є I (capieel). The 
generation costs depend on the exogenously given price of fuel f Є F fuel price pffe and efficiency 
level η fie depending on the plant and fuel type.4  In order to derive carbon emissions, each fuel is 
characterized by its physical carbon content θf. Assuming perfect competition, each generator 
maximizes his profit under the capacity restriction choosing the generation quantity Xieel given the 
electricity price Peel consisting of PHUB and PTe as well as the emission price Peemi: 
  
0 : 0
max
el
e
fie
emi
fe f eel el
e i
X i f fie
pf P
PT PHUB X


 
       e  
 s.t.            (21) 0el el elie ie iecap X PC  
PCieel is the scarcity price of the generation capacity of plant type i at node e. Accordingly, the zero-
profit condition for each plant becomes: 
 0
emi
fe f e el el el
e e ie
fie
pf P
PC PT PHUB X


       (22) 
The transmission prices PTe are determined by the market clearing condition for the system operator. 
At any node the energy injected or withdrawn from the grid has to equal the difference between 
generation and demand: 
 freeel el ele ie e e
i
Y X DEM PT    (23) 
Furthermore the overall market clearing condition defines the system marginal price PHub: 
  (24) 
,
0el elie e
i e e
X DEM PHUB   
Denoting the exogenously given allowed carbon emissions at node e by Eemax, the carbon price at a 
node is determined by the following market clearing condition:5 
 max
, : 0
                      0
fie
emi
f e el emi
e ie
e f fie
P
E X


  eP 
                                                     
 (25) 
The full electricity model consists of equation (17) to (25). Similar to the natural gas model the 
electricity model is static. Therefore, pump storage facilities are not regarded but could easily be 
added by including the zero-profit condition of the storage operator and the respective demand and 
supply to the market clearing equation. Furthermore, we imposed linearity and perfect competition.  
4 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each plant type produces with only one fuel, i.e. for each (i,e) η fie is strictly 
positive for exactly one fuel f. Therefore, the efficiency parameter also serves to establish a mapping between the generation 
technology set I and the set of fuels f. Relaxing this assumption, requires extending the range of the generation variable, i.e. 
introducing Xfieel as the amount generated by plant i at node e using fuel f. 
5 We formulate the general model with an emission restriction at every node. However, the modification for allowing 
allowances trade between generators located at different nodes is straightforward by introducing a subset of the electricity 
node set e which determines generators allowed to trade. In turn, the emission price in the zero profit condition (22) is 
replaced by the price of the respective trading system.  
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2.3 Combining energy networks 
In order two combine the models, two steps are necessary: First, we need to determine at which nodes 
electricity generators demand natural gas, i.e. which nodes of the gas network are also nodes of the 
electricity network. Second, the models are linked by making the demand in the gas network and the 
natural gas price in the electricity model endogenous. 
For the first step we assume that natural gas is supplied to each electricity generator. However, natural 
gas is also delivered to non-electricity nodes. We establish a mapping (i.e. a two dimensional tuple) 
between the set of natural gas and electricity nodes which is denoted as GE(g,e) and associates each 
electricity node to exactly one natural gas node. However, one natural gas nodes may serve various 
electricity nodes. At the electricity generation nodes, natural gas demand consists of the demand of 
electricity generators and further residential demand. Accordingly, generators’ demand is added to the 
natural gas demand market clearing equation (15). Denoting the natural gas plant as gas Є I and 
natural gas as fuel also by gas Є F, the natural gas demand market clearing equation at electricity 
generation nodes becomes: 
 ,,
( , ) , ,
                   0           
el
gas egas gas gas
h g g g
h e GE g e gas gas e
X
T DEM PD g N        (26) 
We now endogenize the natural gas price in the electricity model. This is done by replacing the 
generators’ zero profit condition (22) by a version with the natural gas price as a variable. For natural 
gas plants the equation becomes:6 
 ( , ) ,
, ,
         0       
gas emi
g i e
g GE g e el el el
e e i e
gas i e
PD P
PC PT PHUB X i gas




     
   (27) 
For non-natural gas plants, the generators’ zero profit condition remains the same: 
 0        \emife f e el el ele e ie
fie
pf P
PC PT PHUB X i I gas


        
                                                     
 (28) 
The combined model consists of equation (2) to (28) without equation (15) and (22). Obviously, the 
underlying assumptions are the same as those in the single models. 
 
3 Sample application 
3.1 Parameterization and scenarios 
In our application, we combine a stylized representation of the European natural gas and electricity 
transmission markets. The basic model parameters are taken from Neumann et al. (2009) for the gas 
market representation and from Leuthold et al. (2008) for the electricity market. The combined model 
covers central and western European countries with respect to natural gas and electricity demand 
6 Note that by the above assumption that each electricity node is served by exactly one natural gas node, the sum on the left 
hand side includes exactly one element.   
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(Figure 1). Whereas the gas model also includes the UK, Ireland, Norway and Sweden as demand 
nodes and several exporting nodes outside Europe (e.g., Russia, Algeria, and Lybia), the electricity 
market representation is limited to the continental European countries. Both markets are represented in 
a highly stylized setting with one node representing the whole country. Cross border transmission is 
either modeled by single connections between those country nodes (natural gas) or via several cross 
border lines connected to the respective country nodes via tie lines (electricity). 
The model is calibrated to represent 2005 values (see Table 4 in the Appendix). The time resolution of 
the model is limited to an average hour not taking account of seasonal or daily demand and production 
patterns. Natural gas and electricity demand are taken from Eurostat (2010). Demand is assumed to be 
linear based on reference demand and price values with an elasticity at this reference point of -0.5 for 
natural gas and -0.25 for electricity. Electricity generation is clustered into nine technologies based on 
UCTE (2007): nuclear, lignite, coal, gas, oil, mixed, other, hydro, and pumped storage.7 Table 1 
shows the underlying assumptions regarding fuel prices, efficiency and emission factors. We do not 
account for spatial differences in those values. 
We analyze three different scenarios to highlight the interaction between the linked markets. First a 
Base case is derived applying the above described dataset. This base case represents the benchmark of 
our analysis. In the second scenario we analyze the impact of a change in the natural gas market on the 
system (Russian case). We assume a sharp reduction in exports from Russia via the Ukraine to a level 
of about 50% of the base case exports. This will lead to supply shortages in South-East Europe, impact 
the natural gas flow and price pattern and, thus, possibly the electricity generation. In a third scenario 
we analyze the reverse interaction due to a change in the electricity market setting by introducing 
emission trading (Emission case). Taking the base case emissions as benchmark we require a 15% 
emission reduction target. The resulting emission allowance price will lead to a reduction of the cost 
advantage of coal in favor of natural gas which increases the demand for the latter which impacts the 
natural gas market. 
Table 1: Electricity generation specifications 
Technology Fuel price [€/MWhth] 
Efficiency CO2 emissions[t/MWhth] 
nuclear 3 30% 0.00 
lignite 5 35% 0.36 
coal 6 35% 0.35 
gas endogenous 40% 0.20 
oil 10 35% 0.28 
mixed 9 35% 0.28 
other 12 35% 0.35 
hydro 0 100% 0.00 
pumped storage 25 75% 0.00 
Source: IPCC (2006), own assumptions 
 
                                                     
7 Mixed generation represents a large variety of multi fuel engines running on coal and/or gas and/or oil. We do not consider 
their demand as part of the natural gas demand. 
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Figure 1: Networks 
 Natural Gas Network
Electricity Network
 
Source: based on Neumann et al. (2009) and Leuthold et al. (2008) 
                European pipelines 
                Non-European pipelines 
                LNG routes 
                Country tie lines 
                380kV cross border line 
                220kV cross border line 
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3.2 Result overview8 
In the Base case the natural gas market can roughly be clustered into three supply regions: Western 
and Central Europe are largely supplied with natural gas from the North Sea (Norway and the 
Netherlands), Eastern Europe is supplied by Russia, and Southern Europe is supplied by Africa 
(Algeria and Lybia). The Iberian Peninsula does not exchange gas with the rest of Europe and is solely 
relying on African gas and LNG import. Italy is, beside the African amounts, importing gas via its 
northern neighbors Switzerland and Austria. A similar pattern can be observed in the electricity 
market. Spain and Portugal are a separate price zone due to congestion between France and Spain 
(Table 2). Italy is the “electricity sink” of Europe which consequently leads to a high price level and 
congestion at the cross border lines. Northern and Eastern Europe are more or less on a coal based 
price level. The generation pattern follows the merit order with hydro, nuclear, and lignite being fully 
utilized (Table 3). Coal and gas power plants are dispatched according to the availability capacities 
within the country taking into account the local natural gas price (cost parity of electricity from gas 
and coal occurs at a gas price of 6.85 €/MWh). 
In the Russian case the imports via the Ukraine are significantly reduced which leads to higher natural 
gas prices in South East Europe (Table 2). Furthermore, Italy faces higher prices and routes a part of 
its African imports to Austria and Slovenia. The situation in North and West Europe is similar to the 
Base case as neither the North Sea gas nor the Russian imports via Belarus and Poland are affected. In 
the electricity market those countries facing higher gas prices in general also face higher electricity 
prices. In contrast the Benelux and France face slightly lower electricity prices (Table 2). The 
generation dispatch for hydro, nuclear, and lignite is similar to the base case as those technologies are 
cheaper than coal or gas and dispatched according to the merit order. Electricity generation from 
natural gas drops to 27 GW (from 40 GW in the base case) due to reduced output in Italy and 
Hungary. Overall coal generation remains at a level of about 50 GW (Table 3). 
In the Emission case the allowed total emissions are cut to 85% of the emissions in the base case. Due 
to the binding emission cap an allowance price of about 5.5 €/tCO2 occurs and consequently electricity 
prices increase on average (Table 2). As coal units emit about 1 t per generated MWh electricity 
whereas natural gas units only emit 0.5 t the price parity between coal and gas is now at a natural gas 
price of 7.86 €/MWh. Consequently gas based electricity production is increased to about 50 GW 
while coal is reduced to 30 GW (Table 3). This leads to a general increase in demand for natural gas 
and on average to higher domestic gas prices across Europe even in countries that do not increase gas 
based electricity generation like (Benelux) or that are not accounted for in the electricity model (UK). 
In contrast, Portugal and Spain even face a gas price decrease (Table 2). 
As LNG capacities are already binding in the base case, none of the scenarios affect LNG trade 
patterns.  
 
                                                     
8 A graphical representation of the obtained results in presented in the Appendix. 
 13
Table 2: Demand price outcomes [€/MWh] 
 Base case Russian case Emission case 
Country Natural gas Electricity Natural gas Electricity Natural gas Electricity 
Austria 8.46 18.86 11.26 19.32 8.46 24.17 
Belgium 8.40 18.91 8.42 18.23 8.73 23.34 
Czech Republic 8.29 17.35 8.31 17.40 8.46 23.33 
Denmark 6.64 17.14 6.66 17.14 6.97 23.21 
France 8.95 16.21 8.97 15.98 9.28 17.39 
Germany 7.74 17.14 7.76 17.14 8.07 23.21 
Hungary 8.34 20.84 10.05 21.63 8.92 25.33 
Ireland 8.40  8.42  8.73  
Italy 9.78 24.44 10.29 25.71 9.78 27.47 
Netherlands 7.08 18.14 7.10 17.76 7.41 23.28 
Norway 5.76  5.78  6.09  
Poland 6.24 17.14 6.24 17.14 6.24 23.21 
Portugal 9.27 23.18 9.27 23.18 8.46 24.19 
Slovakia 7.69 16.88 10.49 16.81 7.69 23.06 
Slovenia 9.12  11.50  9.12  
Spain 9.27 23.18 9.27 23.18 8.46 24.19 
Sweden 7.74  7.76  8.07  
Switzerland 9.01 14.75 9.52 15.05 9.01 24.33 
UK 7.74  7.76  8.07  
Table 3: Electricity generation [MW] 
 Hydro Nuclear Lignite Coal Gas Mixed 
Base Case 
Germany 2335 18270 18270 17857 0  
Benelux 47 5603 0 3968 14712  
France 9585 56970 0 0 0  
Eastern Europe 1352 7106 15861 14239 2554  
Alps 10554 2880 0 1573 90  
Italy 6075 0 0 4230 16931  
Iberia 7876 6712 3082 8418 5468  
Russian Case 
Germany 2335 18270 18270 21864 0  
Benelux 47 5603 0 3968 14510  
France 9585 56970 0 0 0  
Eastern Europe 1352 7106 15861 11274 668  
Alps 10554 2880 0 1573 90  
Italy 6075 0 0 4230 5193 12108 
Iberia 7876 6712 3082 8418 5468  
Emission Case 
Germany 2335 18270 18270 2861 5640  
Benelux 47 5603 0 3968 14712  
France 9585 56970 0 0 0  
Eastern Europe 1352 7106 15861 11795 3457  
Alps 10554 2880 0 1573 197  
Italy 6075 0 0 4230 15618  
Iberia 7876 6712 3082 8418 5034  
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3.3 Comparison and discussion 
Comparing the Russian and the Base case we observe the impact of changes in the natural gas market 
on the downstream electricity market. The cut of imports from Russia via the southern route including 
Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia leads to significant price increases in these countries. Hungary has to 
completely cut gas based electricity production. Italy also has to sharply reduce its gas based 
generation since a large fraction of its gas imports came from Russia via Austria. Consequently, more 
costly mixed based generation is used in Austria. Beside these obvious results which would also be 
forecasted without a combined model setting several side effects can be observed. Hungary shifts from 
an electricity export to an import position. In turn, the whole electricity flow pattern in East Europe is 
affected. To replace the reduced gas generation in Hungary the cheapest alternative is coal energy 
from northern countries. However, Polish coal generation, although possible from a generation 
capacity point of view, can not be utilized due to congestion problems between Hungary and Slovakia. 
Therefore, Germany increases its coal generation to cover the Hungarian demand. However, this 
changes the power flow pattern via Austria towards Italy. As a result Germany increases its coal 
production beyond the need of Hungary. In turn, Poland reduces its generation to allow a further 
power flow towards the import depended Italy.9 A side effect of the increased coal generation in 
Germany is the reduced imports via the Netherlands. Therefore, the available Dutch natural gas 
generation capacities can be slightly shifted to satisfy a larger fraction of the Belgian demand and 
relive congestion at the Benelux borders. Consequently the price level in the Benelux slightly drops 
(Table 2).  
The emission case illustrates the impact of a change in the electricity market on the upstream natural 
gas market. By introducing a binding emission target, the relative marginal cost ratios are altered 
towards less emission intensive generation technologies. Therefore, a switch from the most emission 
intensive coal technology to the least intensive gas technology is observed. Due their non-emitting 
character and since they are already at the capacity bound in the base case, hydro and nuclear based 
generation does not alter. Furthermore, as the reduction of coal based generation is sufficient to 
comply with the reduction target, lignite based generation is also not affected. Coal production is cut 
back in those countries that are able to compensate the fallback by increased imports or a switch to gas 
based production. The majority of reduction takes place in Germany were about 15 GW or coal 
generation is shut down, followed by Poland with about 2 GW. As the carbon price increases the cost 
of electricity generation, the electricity price increases. In the consequence, demand is decreasing by 
about 5%. Therefore, the 5 GW increase of gas based generation does not outweigh the decrease in 
coal based generation. Germany significantly increases its imports which in turn leads to a shift of 
power flow patterns towards Germany. The only country reducing gas based generation is Italy due to 
its high gas prices and the electricity demand reduction resulting from the emission allowance price.  
                                                     
9 Coal prices and power plant efficiencies are not locational differentiated. Thus the only cost difference between Polish and 
German coal production is its impact on the network. 
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Domestic natural gas prices increase in most countries by 4% to 7%, even in those countries that are 
not part of the electricity market representation. However, most East European countries do not face a 
price increase as they are either capable to increase their imports from Russia (Slovakia and Czech 
Republic) or do not rely on natural gas generation (Poland).  
Surprisingly, the Iberian Peninsula even has lower natural gas prices. This is a result of their isolated 
network situation. Their electricity imports from France are bounded by the low capacities in the 
Pyrenees and their gas imports by their LNG terminals and connection to Africa. Thus, the 
introduction of emission trading does not influence the trade pattern in either market. However, the 
electricity price increase leads to a slight reduction of electricity demand. As the emission price is not 
high enough, natural gas fired generation is still the marginal technology in the merit order. Therefore, 
the output of these plants is reduced. The reduced demand for gas of the electricity sector causes a 
price decrease which, in turn, stimulates final demand. Therefore, the total gas demand (consisting of 
domestic and electricity gas demand) does not change in these countries. 
Although, the presented results are highly depended on the chosen dataset, particular the underlying 
fuel price assumptions, the scenarios highlight the possible interactions of natural gas and electricity 
network markets. The fuel connection of gas as input factor of electricity generation leads to obvious 
results in case the gas price level or the generation dispatch is altered. The network character of both 
markets leads to further effects that are not obvious on first sight. Congestion between markets and 
particular effects due to loop flows in electricity markets can lead to price and quantity effects in 
markets distant to the initial cause of market changes.  
 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the interaction of natural gas and electricity markets taking account of the 
network character of both markets. We design an MCP formulation of the combined markets assuming 
perfect competition on all market stages. Applying the model to a stylized representation of Europe, 
we show that both a change on the supply situation in the natural gas market and the generation 
dispatch in the electricity market have an impact on the respective downstream and upstream market 
beyond the pure price connection. Congestion between markets and particular effects due to loop 
flows in electricity markets can lead to price and quantity effects in markets distant to the initial cause 
of market changes. 
The presented results highlight the importance of a combined market assessment for market 
participants and political institutions setting market and regulatory designs. Companies active in one 
or several energy markets need to include the network dimension in their market assessments when 
facing crucial investment or expansion plans. Similar institutions setting market rules need to take the 
interactions into account. This is particularly important for the electricity sector as decisions on this 
market (i.e., future network extension plans, emission reduction targets, or renewable integration) 
directly influence all upstream fuel market.  
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The presented model is simplified and the underlying assumptions are stylized and particular the 
electricity generation parameters lack spatial differentiation. On a model scale level further 
adjustments need to include dynamic representation and a larger spatial detail level. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of further energy markets – namely coal and oil – would provide a more comprehensive 
scheme than the presented model. Finally, the model formulation as MCP allows an adaptation of 
further market participants as well as strategic company behavior. An extension of the approach 
including sequential strategic timing would allow analyzing the role of the electricity market as 
Stackelberg leader for upstream markets.  
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Appendix 
Table 4: Dataset 
Country 
Natural gas 
demand  
[GW per h] 
Electricity 
demand 
[GW per h] 
Natural gas 
capacities 
[GW] 
Electricity 
capacities 
[GW] 
LNG  
capacities 
[GW] 
Austria 12.1 7.2 1.5 18.2  
Belgium 21.8 10.0  15.4 4.5 
Czech Republic 11.4 7.2 0.2 16.2  
Denmark 6.5 2.4 9.8 3.5  
France 60.8 55.1 1.8 113.4 14.6 
Germany 119.6 63.5 18.6 101.3  
Hungary 17.9 4.5 2.7 7.1  
Ireland 5.1 0.0 0.5 na  
Italy 104.5 37.7 11.3 86.8 3.5 
Netherlands 52.3 13.1 121.0 20.9  
Norway 7.6 0.0 97.4 na  
Poland 18.1 14.9 5.7 32.1  
Portugal 5.6 5.7  11.6 5.2 
Slovakia 8.8 3.0 0.1 7.3  
Slovenia 1.4 1.5  2.8  
Spain 44.2 28.9 0.2 65.5 25.3 
Sweden 1.2 0.0  na  
Switzerland 4.1 7.2  16.7  
UK 126.5 0.0 105.1 na 4.5 
Source: Neumann et al. (2009), Leuthold et al. (2008), UCTE (2007), Eurostat (2010) 
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Figure 2: Base case, natural gas market, prices and congestion 
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Figure 3: Base case, electricity market, prices and congestion 
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Figure 4: Russian case, natural gas market, prices and congestion 
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Figure 5: Russian case, electricity market, prices and congestion 
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Figure 6: Emission case, natural gas market, prices and congestion 
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Figure 7: Emission case, electricity market, prices and congestion 
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